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Abstract
This article discusses the enforceability of treaties under Indonesian legal system. The purpose 
of this article is to explore and provide answers to the following questions: (i) whether or not 
international law may be directly invoked and enforceable under domestic legal system (ii) how and 
to what extent Indonesian courts are using international law especially the treaties. In providing 
analysis to the above questions, this article discusses the notion of courts and judicial competence 
and judicial attitude towards treaties. This article suggests that there is no doubt that the courts 
may apply treaty provisions to the case at hand without and by virtue of national legislations. 
However, the attitude of the courts towards treaties as demonstrated in a number of cases above 
does not reveal any clear indication on the question of the status of treaties under domestic 
law especially with regard to the method on how the legal system incorporates treaties under 
domestic law. The Court decision has therefore not yet contributed to the attempt for seeking a 
legal determination of the domestic status of a treaty as well as the mode for granting its domestic 
validity.
Keywords: domestic validity, Indonesian perspective, monism and dualism, status of treaties, 
treaty practices.
Pengadilan dan Perjanjian Internasional: Perspektif Indonesia
Abstrak
Artikel ini membahas mengenai pemberlakuan perjanjian internasional dalam sistem hukum 
Indonesia. Tujuan dari artikel ini adalah untuk mengkaji dan memberikan jawaban atas 
pertanyaan-pertanyaan berikut ini: (i) apakah hukum internasional dapat secara langsung 
dijadikan rujukan dan berlaku dalam sistem hukum domestik; (ii) bagaimana dan sampai mana 
pengadilan Indonesia menggunakan hukum internasional khususnya perjanjian internasional. 
Dalam memberikan analisis terhadap pertanyaan-pertanyaan diatas, artikel ini membahas 
perihal pengadilan dengan kompetensi yudisialnya, dan perilaku yudisial terhadap perjanjian 
internasional. Artikel ini berkesimpulan bahwa pengadilan dapat menerapkan langsung perjanjian 
internasional terhadap perkara. Namun demikian praktik pengadilan dalam beberapa perkara yang 
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terkait dengan perjanjian internasional belum memberikan indikasi yang jelas tentang kedudukan 
hukum perjanjian. Putusan Pengadilan oleh karena itu belum berkontribusi dalam upaya untuk 
mencari determinasi hukum terkait status domestik dari suatu perjanjian internasional dan cara 
pemberlakuan suatu perjanjian internasional dalam hukum domestik.
Kata kunci: monisme dan dualisme, praktek perjanjian internasional, perspektif Indonesia, status 
perjanjian internasional, validitas domestik.
A. Introduction
Are Indonesian Courts bound by a treaty to 
which Indonesia is a party? Are its judges free 
to apply international rules? These simple 
questions are unfortunately encountered with 
legal difficulties. Although Indonesia inherits 
the monist-tradition of the Dutch colonial 
power (the tradition of which all binding treaties 
are always domestically applicable before the 
courts), the question of enforceability of treaties 
is still open under the current Indonesian legal 
system, which is far from certain. Neither 
constitutional provisions nor legal doctrine is 
yet satisfactory in dealing with this compelling 
question. 
It has been traditionally argued that 
domestic courts find obstacles in the way of 
direct application of international law because 
of the notions of state sovereignty, separation 
of powers and the principle of legality1 
under dualist pretext over the relationship 
between international law and domestic 
law. Nevertheless, using international law in 
domestic courts under modern legal jurisdiction 
has widely been accepted. Even in that dualist 
legal system, where international law is 
relatively isolated from domestic law, the use 
of international in deciding the case, albeit in 
various modes, has been a common practice.2
Constitution of 1945 as recently amended 
including existing legislations, state practices, 
as well as legal doctrines, are still silent on 
the question whether or not international law 
may be directly invoked and enforceable under 
domestic legal system. Therefore this article 
attempts to explore whether the answer to the 
question is there and available in Indonesian 
judicial attitudes. How and to what extent 
Indonesian Courts make use of international 
law especially treaties in deciding cases before 
it would be the central focus with a view of 
finding the general trend, if any, with regard to 
mentioned-above question.
B. Courts and the Judicial Competence 
On the basis of the Rechtsstaat principle, judicial 
powers are set up distinct from other state 
powers. Article 24 A of the 1945 Constitution of 
the Republic of Indonesia rules that the judicial 
powers shall be independent with the authority 
to organize the judicature in order to uphold 
law and justice. Under the present Constitution, 
the judicial powers are vested in two distinct 
courts and one commission:
(a) The Supreme Court 
(b) The Constitutional Court 
(c) The Judicial Commission 
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1 Ferdinandusse, Ward, Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National Courts, Assers (2006), 221-268.
2 Under dualist legal system, international law should be transformed into domestic law in order to be available before the Courts. 
Nevertheless, some juridical techniques have developed so that the Courts may apply international law as if international law was 
directly applicable, see Fatimah, Shaheed, Using International Law in Domestic Courts, Oxford (2005).
It is just recently that the courts are 
becoming independent as well as impartial. 
The present independent and impartial status 
of judicial institutions is also encouraged by a 
strong public call following the political reform 
since 1998. Before the reform, as envisaged 
by the previous Law No. 14 of 1970 on Justice, 
the courts were under administrative control 
of the Ministry of Justice (executive) thus 
leading to the so-called ‘two hat’ controversy3 
whereby judges had two authorities they had 
to answer to, i.e. to the Minister of Justice for 
administrative matters and to the Supreme 
Court for substantive matters. This created 
doubts on their independence and impartiality. 
Following the constitutional reform in 2000, as 
affected by the Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial 
Powers, the Supreme Court and the newly set-
up Constitutional Court in 2004 have become 
independent judicial institutions and take 
care of their own organization, administrative 
matters as well as budget.
As Indonesia is rooted in the civil law 
tradition, and apparently prefers to remain in 
that tradition, the courts are not bound by the 
previous decisions of the courts (precedence). 
However, consideration to the courts’ decisions 
are very significant to be paid for, as it can 
explains how the norms are operating and 
applied in a concrete case.
C. Attitude towards Treaties 
1. Introductory Remarks
Cases arising directly from the question of the 
domestic status of treaties in Indonesia are still 
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rare, partly because the domestic law relating 
to treaties is not yet well developed and there 
was small legal interest in the Indonesian 
legal system to have it being developed. 
Consequently, the courts have not yet been 
enthusiastic to express their perception towards 
the domestic status of treaties and therefore 
have hardly indicated any direction and trend 
with regard to the question. 
From the various interviews with the 
Indonesian judges and legal practitioners, a 
small group of judges have held an approach 
that treaties have been transformed into 
domestic law by virtue of the laws approving 
the treaties and will treat them as binding laws.4 
No trend in the case law however convincingly 
supports this approach. Most judges apparently 
show indifference towards treaties. The 
acknowledgement in the legal theory as taught 
in Indonesia, that treaties are sources of law, 
apparently does not have any effect to the 
manner the courts treat and give weight to 
treaties. According to the prevailing law, treaties 
are still outside the recognized sources of law 
in Indonesia and are hardly acknowledged as 
what the theory dictates. Even to the judges 
that have good knowledge of international law, 
treaties are not more important than the laws.5 
Another group of judges recognize the binding 
force of treaties but in the same vein their 
application is contingent to the implementing 
legislations, and will only refer to the treaty 
provisions if the domestic legislations are not 
sufficiently clear.6   
3 Timothy Lindsey, ‘Indonesia, Reinventing a Legal System, Too Much, Too Little, Too Late’, in Alice Tay (ed.), East Asia, Human Rights, 
Nation-Building, Trade (1999), 519.
4 Hadhyono, Suparti, ‘Praktek Penerapan Perjanjian Internasional dalam Putusan Hakim (Treaties under National Court)’, Focus Group 
Discussion, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Indonesia-Law Faculty of University Airlangga Surabaya (2008).
5 Interview with Judge Nameandriani Nurdin, Chief of District Court of Central Jakarta, 7 May 2011 (unpublished, on file with author).
6 Inteview with Supreme Court Justice, Professor Mieke Komar Kantaatmadja, 28 February 2011 (unpublished, on file with author).
However, there are recently a growing 
number of court decisions that touch upon 
and make either direct or indirect reference 
to treaties. Jurisprudence making reference 
to treaties is in most cases closely related to 
globalization related treaties, such as trade 
and human rights. The Supreme Courts and 
the Constitutional Courts have recently used 
provisions of treaties for various purposes, 
ranging from merely supporting their legal 
arguments, seeking clarification for interpreting 
unclear legal principles and provisions, to more 
authoritative one by invoking them as legal 
norms. Treaties to which Indonesia is bound 
have been invoked in most cases before the 
courts not only as a tool of interpretation 
for domestic legislation but also for their 
application to the particular cases. Likewise, the 
respective party to the case has also attempted 
to explore and develop arguments on the basis 
of the provisions of treaties and made necessary 
references to all resources available within the 
province of international law.
The establishment of the Constitutional 
Court has contributed to a growing number 
of cases relating to international law because 
it deals mostly with the judicial review of 
statutes/laws against human rights provisions 
of the Constitution in which many relevant 
treaties are closely involved. Although the 
Constitutional Court does not directly deal 
with the conflict between the provisions of 
domestic laws and treaties, it seeks reference 
from treaties as aids to interpretation to 
ensure that the constitutionality of the law 
shall also conform to international law. The 
Court therefore interprets laws before it in the 
manner that they are not in conflict with the 
rule of international law.
To date no case has been reported 
concerning claims in whole or in part based 
directly and independently on the provisions 
of treaties, or reviewing the legality of 
national acts in the light of treaty obligations 
or concerning interpretation and application 
of treaty rules. The Supreme Court as well as 
the Constitutional Court at the present stage 
generally apply provisions of a treaty in the 
context of, and connected with, the application 
of domestic provisions. They normally use 
treaties as tools of interpretation to the 
issue arising from the provisions of domestic 
legislations. The mainstream approach still puts 
emphasis on domestic provisions and will refer 
only to treaties if the domestic law is not clear 
with regard to the given case or an additional 
clarification is still required to clarify a vague 
domestic legal concept. 
2. Survey of Judicial Practice
a. Guiding Principle in the Constitutional Court 
(Mahkamah Konstitusi)
The Constitutional Court has established 
a guiding principle underlying the use of 
international law in deciding a case. In a case 
concerning judicial review of the blasphemy law 
involving religious freedom, the Constitutional 
Court holds that the compliance of Indonesia 
to international law including treaties is 
characterized by, and shall be in accordance 
with, the philosophy of the state as well as the 
Constitution.7 It impliedly suggests that the 
Constitution is supreme to international law.
b. Treaty Rules applied as authoritative
There is a number of cases that are directly 
concerned with the application of the provisions 
7 MK, case No. 140/PUU-VII/2009, 275.
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of a treaty to a dispute. The Supreme Court, which 
mostly deals with private cases, encountered 
cases relating to intellectual property rights, 
for which appropriate treaties are relevant. 
In its decisions in 1990 the Court invoked 
international obligations of Indonesia arising 
from the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property of 1883 to which Indonesia 
is a party.8 The Court made a ruling by applying 
the provisions of the Convention. In a number 
of similar cases, the Supreme Court has 
applied the provisions of treaties particularly 
concerning the protection of so-called well-
known trademarks as stipulated in the Paris 
Convention and the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS) 
to which Indonesia is a party. In a trademark 
dispute,9 where the Court was requested by a 
party to annul a registration of a well-known 
trademark by another party, the Supreme Court 
applied Article 6 bis of the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property which led 
to a decision in favour of the requesting party. 
As an archipelagic state comprising a 
huge economic exclusive zone, Indonesia 
encounters an increasing number of cases on 
illegal fishing in the zone. The cases before the 
courts mostly involve the relevant provisions 
of the UNCLOS 1982 which are applicable in 
the zone. In a number of cases, the Supreme 
Court cites Article 73 (3) of the UNCLOS 1982 
concerning the prohibition of imprisonment for 
the violations of fisheries law in the zone. 
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In Yu Yuen Jun10 and Lao Chong11, decided 
respectively in 2007 and 2009, albeit contended 
by the defendant on the basis of Article 73 (3) of 
the UNCLOS 1982, the Supreme Court ignored 
the prohibition contained in the Convention 
and kept imposing imprisonment without 
any legal clarification why the Court was not 
bound by the treaty provision. The compliance 
to the provision has been increasingly held in 
the subsequent cases. In the Bui Ngoc Sanh 
case decided recently in 2012, a captain of a 
Vietnamese fishing ship was arrested on the 
allegation of illegal fishing within the economic 
exclusive economic zone of Indonesia in Natuna 
Sea. The Court of first instance (District Court) 
endorsed a punishment with 6 month in jail. 
The defendant brought the case to the Higher 
Court by invoking Article 73 (3) of the UNCLOS 
1982. The Higher Court then held:
According to Article 73 (3) of the UNCLOS 
1982 or Article 73 (3) the Law No. 17 of 1985, 
it is prohibited to impose imprisonment for 
violations of fisheries law in the exclusive 
economic zone…therefore the Judgment of the 
Court in the first instance should be corrected 
to the extent of the penalties imposed to the 
defendant…12  
The Compliance to the provision of the 
UNCLOS in a similar case in 2012 continues 
to be held, where fines were imposed to the 
defendant without involving imprisonment 
by making reference to the provision of the 
Convention.13  
8 Supreme Court Cases on Knirps (1991), Gucci (1992), Giordano (1994), see Sudargo Gautama and Rizawanto Winata, Pembaharuan 
Hukum Merk Indonesia: dalam Rangka WTO, TRIPS (Reform of Trademark Laws  in Indonesia with Respect to WTO, TRIPS) (1997), 372.
9 MA, Subway case, No. 736 K/Pdt.Sus/2009, 12-13.
10 MA, Yu Yuen Jun, No. 893 K/Pid/2007.
11 MA, Lao Chong, No. 1596 K/Pid.Sus/2009.
12 PT Pekanbaru, Bui Ngoc Sanh, No. 66/Pid-Sus/2012/PTR, 7.
13 PT Pontianak, Le Van Thong, No. 104/Pid.Sus/2012/PT.PTK, 11; PT Pontianak, Nguyen Van BE, No. 195/PID.SUS/2012/ PT. PTK, 
11/. However, in a similar case, the Higher Court of Pekanbaru while acknowledging the prohibition of imposing inprisonment 
Apart from cases concerning violations of 
fishing law in the economic exclusive zone, there 
was also a case arising from the application of 
provisions of the UNCLOS 1982 concerning the 
right of innocent passage in territorial sea. In 
the Chen Guo Ping case, a captain of a Chinese 
fishing ship who was accused of illegal fishing in 
the territorial sea of Indonesia in the Aru sea, 
was released by the District Court in Timika 
on the account that there was no evidence to 
prove that the defendant was only exercising 
innocent passage and nor prove that the 
defendant violated the fishing law. In the appeal 
proceeding, the prosecutor built up arguments 
invoking the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS 
1982 and arguing:
“The Court of first instance has wrongly 
understood the meaning of innocent 
passage. It should have considered other 
relevant rules pertaining to the issue 
and in this regard what it should mean 
according to the UNCLOS 1982 which has 
been ratified by the Law No. 17 of 1985 
and the Law No. 6 of 1996 concerning 
Indonesian Waters. One of the activities 
that is prohibited by Article 19 (2) the Law 
No. 17 of 1985 concerning Ratification 
of the UNCLOS 1982 is fishing. According 
to the Convention, ships while exercising 
innocent passage shall stow their fishing 
gear and equipment. It is evidenced from 
the witnesses that upon the arrest the 
fishing gear and equipment were not 
stowed, and one ton of fishes were found 
in the vessel.”14 
Unfortunately the Supreme Court did not 
reach the merits of the case where it could 
otherwise pronounce some ruling concerning 
the meaning of innocent passage under the 
Convention because it rejected the appeal on 
the ground of procedural constraint, under 
which the prosecutor could not bring the case 
for appeal because in the Court of first instance, 
the defendant was unconditionally released 
from the charge. Under the procedural law, the 
Supreme Court could only accept the appeal 
if the judgment of the Court of first instance 
does not amount to unconditional release. Had 
the Court of first instance released him under 
specific conditions, the Supreme Court should 
have dealt with the merits of the case.
The Court of first instance in Jayapura 
gave due regard to treaties in general in a case 
concerning the imprisonment of a 15 year old 
child that committed a crime. The Prosecutor 
charged the child for criminal offence and asked 
the Court to impose imprisonment. The Court 
held that:
In deciding the sentence, the Court 
should take into consideration international 
conventions concerning the rights of child as 
well as the laws concerning child protection. 
In this regard, taking into account that the 
defendant is still teenager and attending junior 
school, especially having due regard that 
prison devoted for children is not yet available 
in this region, the imprisonment sentence will 
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has pronounced that a sort of short detention (pidana kurungan) may also be applied. The Court argued that accroding to the 
classification under article 10 of Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP), pidana kurungan is another kind of penalties and is not pidana 
penjara (‘inprisonment”) meanwhile the prohibition envisaged by the Fisheries Law confines only to pidana penjara. It appears that 
the Court has interpreted the Criminal Code in  a manner so that the outcome would be incompatible with the article 73 (3) of the 
UNCLOS because pidana kurungan is also a form of corporal punishment, which is prohibited by the Convention, se PT Pekanbaru, 
Tran Huu Tuyen, No. 52/PID.SUS/2012/PTR.
14 MA, Chen Guo Ping, No. 232 K/Pid.Sus/2007, 5-7.
negatively affect the physiological development 
and the future of the defendant…. The Court 
therefore, while finding that the defendant is 
guilty, decides to return the defendant to his 
parent.15 
The Supreme Court directly applied the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to 
cases involving and affecting foreign embassies. 
In two separated cases concerning the land title 
of the diplomatic premises used by the Embassy 
of Saudi Arabia16 and Malaysia17, private 
persons brought claims that the lands used 
by the two embassies belonged to them and 
asked the Court to annul the land certificates 
that had been issued by the Government for 
these embassies. In the two cases, the Supreme 
Courts rejected the claim of the applicant on the 
ground of diplomatic immunity and inviolability 
of diplomatic premises as stipulated in Articles 
29 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations 1961. 
Although the judgments are not free from 
criticism on a different ground,18 the Supreme 
Court appears to apply directly the provisions 
of the Convention without necessarily 
having examined whether or not there exists 
domestic legislation that give domestic effect 
to the Convention. Until today, Indonesia has 
no domestic law or regulation concerning 
diplomatic immunities apart from Law No. 
1 of 198219 approving/ratifying the Vienna 
Convention and has granted such immunities 
on the basis of that Convention.
The question of self-executing provisions 
of a treaty has been raised in a number of 
cases. In a case concerning intellectual property 
rights,20 the requesting parties asked the 
Supreme Court to apply the Paris Convention by 
arguing that the Convention in this regard is self-
executing. Although the Court decided in favour 
of the requesting party by which the outcome 
of the decision confirmed such protection on 
the basis of a well-known trademark, it failed to 
address the question whether the Convention 
itself is self-executing. The decision of the Court 
was made merely on the technical ground that 
the Court of first instance has made a wrong 
measure in the proceeding by rejecting the 
copy of evidences, a legitimate proof before the 
Court, although it had been properly legalized. 
The Court did not consider it necessary to 
address questions such as whether it is bound 
to apply treaties ratified by Indonesia nor has 
it determined whether the Paris Convention is 
self-executing.
In the recent case concerning the 
constitutionality of the ASEAN Charter, the 
Constitutional Court identifies that Article 1 
(5) of the Charter, which establishes an ASEAN 
free trade area and which is claimed by the 
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15 PN of Jayapura (Court of first instance Jayapura), Yanuar Kayoan Umaf case, No. 65/Pida.B/2012/PN-JPR. 
16 MA, Arabic Saudi case, Fatwa No. WKMA/Yud/04/2006.
17 MA, Malaysia Embassy case, No. 111K/TUN/2000.
18 It has been argued that the Court should have distinguished between the question on land title, which pertains land law, and the 
enjoyment of diplomatic immunity. The question whether or not an embassy acquires a good title to land is exclusively determined 
by land law and has nothing to do with, and shall be distinguished from, the question of diplomatic inviolability. The good title to land 
of an embassy must be presumed as enjoying diplomatic inviolability, see Agusman, Damos Dumoli. Hukum Perjanjian Internasional, 
Kajian Teori dan Praktik di Indonesia (Law of Treaties, Theories and Practice in Indonesia).  Bandung: Refika Aditama (2010), 6. 
19 Law No. 1 of 1982 concerning Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic Relations and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 25 April 
1982, LN (Official State Gazette No. 2/1982).
20 MA, Lexus case, No. 194 K/Pdt.Sus/2011, 6-14.
applicants as violating the Constitution, could 
not be automatically effective21 because the 
next paragraph of the Article (Article 1 (6)) 
stipulates that: Member States shall take all 
necessary measures, including the enactment of 
appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively 
implement the provisions of this Charter and 
to comply with all obligations of membership. 
It may be implied from this particular decision 
that a treaty norm is non-self executing if the 
wording of the norm so indicates. It confirms 
that the Court does not invoke a dualist pretext 
to deny the self-executing nature of a treaty 
norm.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court 
has also applied a provision which is clearly 
non-self-executing by virtue of its merits. In 
a case concerning industrial design22 where 
the Supreme Court was requested to revoke 
the registration of an industrial design on the 
ground that the design was not new, a provision 
of the TRIPS Agreement that is clearly non-self 
executing23 was apparently invoked. It held that:
According to Article 2 (2) of the Law No. 
31 of 2000, Industrial Designs are regarded 
new when on the date of registration it was not 
similar to ones that existed before. According 
to Article 25 (1) of the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods designs are 
not new or original if they do not significantly 
differ from known designs or combinations of 
known design features.
Contrary to the cases above, in some 
exceptional cases the Supreme Court has denied 
the application of a treaty to which Indonesia 
is a party. The Court of first instance in the 
Apriliany Case24 concerning the liability of air 
carriers for luggage lost, which was eventually 
confirmed by the Supreme Court, declined to 
apply the provisions on liability of the Warsaw 
Convention 1929 for the Unification of Certain 
Rules Relating to International Carriage by 
Air on the account that the application of the 
provisions of the Convention to this particular 
case would create unfairness in Indonesia. The 
Court, while acknowledging the provisions of 
the Convention as applicable rules to the case, 
preferred to apply domestic rules in order to 
obtain a more fair outcome.
The case of PT. Nizwar v. Navigation 
Maritime Bulgare (NMB) in 1981 is a controversial 
landmark case, which involves directly a 
question of domestic status of a treaty, i.e. the 
New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958, 
which the Supreme Court declined to directly 
apply. The case concerned the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral award in Indonesia where 
NMB, the winning party, attempted to seek its 
execution under Indonesian jurisdiction. The 
Court of first instance on 10 June 1981 granted 
the request for the enforcement of the arbitral 
award on the ground that Indonesia was bound 
by the Geneva Convention on the Execution of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 by virtue of 
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21 MK, No. 33/PUU-IX/2011, Judicial Review of Law No. 38 of 2008 concerning ASEAN Charter, 189.
22 MK, Industrial Design case, case No. 022 K/N/HaKI/2006, 20.
23 Article 25 (1) TRIP’s Agreements states that Members may provide that designs are not new or original if they do not significantly 
differ from known designs or combinations of known design features. Members may provide that such protection shall not extend to 
designs dictated essentially by technical or functional considerations. By the wordings of the provision is clearly non-self-executing 
because it only recommends member states to provide that designs are not new or original by which domestic legislation for that 
effect is inevitably necessary.
24 MA, Apriliany case No. 970 K/P-dt/2002, 13.
state succession principle from Dutch colony.25 
The Supreme Court overruled the decision 
of the Court of first instance and rejected 
the assertion that Indonesia was bound by 
the Geneva Convention of 1927 by holding 
that in principle and according to Indonesian 
jurisprudence foreign court judgments cannot 
be enforced in Indonesia unless there is 
agreement between Indonesia and the foreign 
state concerning the enforcement of foreign 
judgments. The Court further rejected the state 
succession principle by arguing that despite 
Indonesia being bound by the state succession 
agreement by virtue of Article 5 of the ‘Round 
Table Agreement 1949’ between Indonesia and 
the Netherlands, this did not necessarily mean 
that Indonesia is bound by treaties to which the 
Netherlands was a party. The reason invoked 
by the Court was that the treaty was concluded 
when the world was dominated by colonial 
powers and therefore the state succession 
principle was a product of the situation. 
Apart from these rulings, the Supreme Court 
also endorsed its views concerning the New 
York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958, 
which was ratified by Indonesia by means of 
Presidential Decree No. 40 of 1981 on 5 August 
1981 when the Court examined the case. The 
Court, however, deemed it necessary to express 
it in order to render certainty towards the New 
York Convention. The Court held that:
The denial to the request for the recognition 
of enforcement of foreign arbitral award is due 
to the fact that the implementing legislation 
concerning foreign arbitral award is not yet 
enacted. Therefore, the Supreme Court should 
wait for the enactment of the implementing 
legislation in order to recognize and enforce the 
foreign arbitral award.26 
The Supreme Court judgment on this 
case immediately invited criticism from various 
scholars. Some scholars indicated that the Court 
attitude towards the New York Convention 
reflects the dualist approach.27 The prominent 
scholar on private international law, Sudargo 
Gautama, argued, inter alia, that implementing 
legislation is not necessary because the fact 
that Indonesia is bound by the Convention 
by the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 
40 of 1981 sufficed to provide legal basis for 
the enforcement. In this regard he further 
argued that the Presidential Decree ratifying 
the Convention renders it self-enforcement 
effect.28 T.M. Radhie tried to explain the Court’s 
rejection on the basis of the non-self-executing 
nature of the Convention but finally he found 
the Convention was self-executing.29 The 
scholarly debate on the self-executing status of 
this question was not properly developed and 
unfortunately acquired no further response 
from other scholars. The controversy over the 
status of the Convention was resolved after the 
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25 The succession arrangements were agreed upon under Article 5 of the ‘Round Table Agreement’ 1949 between Indonesia and the 
Netherlands, under which all rights and obligations to the Netherlands arising from treaties to which it was a party continue to be 
applicable to Indonesia, see Ko, Swan Sik, The Indonesian Law and Treaties 1945-1990, Dordrecht, Boston, Norwell: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers (1994), 20.
26 MA, PT. Nizwar v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare; The overview concerning the case may be found in Noah Rubins, ‘The Enforcement 
and Annulment of International Arbitration Awards in Indonesia’, 20 American University International Law Review (2005) 2, 359-401.
27 Fifi Junita, ‘Experience of Practical Problems of Foreign Arbitral Awards Enforcement in Indonesia’, 5 MqJBL (2008), 384-385.
28 Gautama, Sudargo, Hukum Dagang dan Arbitrase Internasional (Trade Law and International Arbitration), Bandung: Citra Aditya Bakti 
(1991), 2.
29 Radhie, T.M, “Konvensi New York tentang Pengakuan Pelaksanaan Putusan Arbitrase Luar Negeri (New York Convention on 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards)”, Working paper delivered at Dispute Resolution through Arbitration Seminar, Jakarta (1990), 
24.
Supreme Court endorsed the Supreme Court’s 
Regulation No. 1 of 1990, which laid down 
administrative procedures on how the foreign 
arbitral award was enforced by the Court. It 
prescribed that the exequatur was required 
from the Supreme Court for the foreign arbitral 
award to be enforced and it might be requested 
through the District Court in Central Jakarta. 
Since then, the debate on this particular issue 
in light of monist-dualist perspective is fading 
away.
The legal reasoning of the Supreme 
Court did not properly address the question 
why it still required implementing regulations. 
It was not clear whether the implementing 
regulations was required in order to make 
the Convention become part of Indonesian 
law (question of domestic validity of the 
Convention) or just to enable the provision of 
the Convention executable (question of non-
self executing provisions). However, in the 
preamble paragraph of the regulation it was 
stated that the existing procedural law was still 
absent concerning execution of foreign arbitral 
awards. The fact that the merely administrative 
procedure could enable the Convention to 
be domestically enforced suggests that the 
problem underlying the non-enforceability of 
Convention at that time was merely the lack 
of administrative procedures as required by 
Article III of the Convention.30 If it is the case, 
it became closely related to the doctrinal 
problem associated with the controversy of 
self-executing or non-self-executing question 
debated in the United States and the states of 
the European Union. It might be presumed that 
the Supreme Court did not actually deny the 
domestic validity of the Convention by virtue 
of Presidential Decree but simply could not 
execute the foreign awards because of the lack 
of procedural rules. In terms of legislation, the 
Supreme Court’s regulations are hardly carrying 
legislative weight and therefore could not be 
regarded as giving effect to transformation/
adoption of the Convention into domestic law.
The suggestion that the Supreme Court 
does actually not deny the domestic validity 
of the New York Convention finds clearer 
expression in a number of cases31 involving 
the Convention concerning the request for 
the annulment of the arbitration award. In the 
recent case, the Supreme Court applied directly 
the provision of the Convention concerning 
the annulment of foreign arbitral awards, by 
stating:
“The New York Convention of 1958, which 
has been ratified by the Presidential 
Decree No. 34 of 1981 and therefore 
has become the norm of national law, 
has stipulated that the annulment of the 
arbitral awards may only be done in the 
state or according to the law where the 
award was granted.”32 
In a number of cases the courts have 
encountered questions concerning the 
application of treaties to the given cases to 
which they have not delivered clear judgments. 
The parties to the various disputes have 
attempted to raise important legal arguments 
which have given the courts the opportunity 
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30 Article III New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958: ‘Each Contracting State shall 
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is 
relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles.’
31 PN of Jakarta (Court of Jakarta District), Karaha Bodas vs Pertamina case No. 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST, 21-22; MA, PT Raya 
Nusantara v. PT Jambi Resources Ltd, 64 K/Pdt.Sus/2010, 43.
32 MA, PT Raya Nusantara v. PT Jambi Resources Ltd, 64 K/Pdt.Sus/2010, 43.
to reveal their attitude towards the status of 
treaties under Indonesian law. Unfortunately, 
the courts have not yet used the opportunity 
for making any ruling in this regard. Instead, 
the courts have commonly escaped from 
addressing the question by invoking procedural 
matters. In the case concerning religious 
freedom mentioned above, the independent 
expert from the requesting party asked the 
Constitutional Court to make a ruling that the 
Constitution shall be adjusted if it is in conflict 
with treaties. The Court, however, declined to 
make such a ruling by arguing that the power to 
amend the Constitution is vested in the People’s 
Consultative Assembly. The Court argued that it 
was only empowered to review the laws against 
the Constitution and not authorized to review 
the Constitution.33  
In a case concerning judicial review of the 
status of Circular Letter of the Cabinet of 1967, 
which stipulates the changing terminology 
used for China, from the word ‘Tionghoa’ to 
be ‘Cina’, the requesting party asked the Court 
to hold that the Letter violated the Law No. 29 
of 1999 approving/ratifying the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Racial Discrimination. The Court, however, 
declined to make a ruling on this question on 
the procedural ground by arguing that the time 
limit for the application of such judicial review 
had elapsed because the prevailing rule of 
procedure of the Court prescribes that the date 
line for a law to be submitted for judicial review 
shall be not longer than 180 days from the date 
of its issuance.34 
The Supreme Court has also been silent on 
the public controversy involving the question 
of the application of treaties. The question 
on the legality of using one of the accused as 
a ‘crown witnesses’ against another accused 
under the same criminal charge was one of 
the issues in public debate35 which has been 
brought to the Court as violating the provision 
of the ICCPR. Albeit not expressly prohibited 
under the current criminal procedure code, 
the practice of examining crown witnesses 
has been allowed by the Supreme Court and 
received severe criticism because it amounted 
to self-incrimination whereby the unfortunate 
situation compels a person to testify against 
himself or to confess guilt. In a number of cases36 
it was submitted before the Supreme Court that 
the use of one of the accused as a crown witness 
to testify against another accused in the same 
criminal charge was in violation to Article 14 (3) 
(g) of the ICCPR to which Indonesia has already 
been a party. The Supreme Court, however, 
was reluctant to address the issue and as result 
the practice continued unchallenged in various 
subsequent cases.
The courts are also ambiguous in 
determining the legal weight of treaties. In 
a case on judicial review concerning the Law 
No. 3 of 1997 concerning Child Court,37 the 
Constitutional Court dealt with the question 
of the binding nature of treaties. In this case, 
the applicant requested the Court to annul, 
inter alia, Article 4 (1) of the Law No. 3 of 
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33 MK, case No. 140/PUU-VII/2009, 275, 293.
34 MA, Circular Letter of the Cabinet 1967, case No. 42 P/HUM/TH. 2006.
35 Setiyono, ‘Eksistensi Saksi Mahkota sebagai Alat Bukti dalam Perkara Pidana’ (Existence of Crown Witness as Evidence in Criminal 
Cases), 5 Lex Jurnalica (2007) 1, 29-37; Adi Andojo Soetjipto, Menyongsong dan Tunaikan Tugas Negara Sampai Akhir: Sebuah 
Memoar (Carry Out and Exert State’s Tasks till the End: A Memoir) (2007), 167.
36 MA, Ferry case, case No. 72 PK/Pid/2010, 43; MA, JUN HAO case, case No. 143 PK/Pid.Sus/2011, 50.
37 MK, case No. 1/PUU-VIII/2010, Judicial Review of Law  No. 3 of 1997 concerning Child Court, 113.
1997, which determined that eight years old 
is a minimum age for a child to be eligible to 
be tried before the court. The applicant argued 
that such minimum age is not compatible with 
the minimum age determined by international 
legal instruments and a number of the UN 
recommendations. In the proceedings, the 
Government made the following proposition: 
“One of the competences of the 
Constitutional Court is judicial review on 
norms contained in a law including the 
Law No. 3 of 1997 concerning Child Court. 
The Constitutional Court shall use the 
Constitution as a pillar for the review, while 
the Court may use treaties as reference 
‘ad-informandum’.”
The Constitutional Court did not, however, 
specifically address the government view but it 
held:
“The Court is of the view that treaties, 
recommendation of the UN Committee 
on the Rights of Childs and other 
international legal instruments stipulate 
that 12 year-old may be used as a 
comparative tool in order to determine 
minimum age for a child to be responsible 
before the law. Nevertheless, the Court 
holds that international legal instrument 
and recommendation ‘as such’ could not 
be used as a tool of review in examining 
the constitutionality of minimum age for 
child.38”
The Constitutional Court was unfortunately 
ambiguous. While it held in the beginning that 
treaties may be used as comparative tool, it made 
on the subsequent paragraph an ambiguous 
statement by stating that international legal 
instruments and recommendations (not 
included ‘treaties’) could not be used as a tool 
of review ‘as such’. There is no clear indication 
from the judgment whether or not the Court 
deliberatively excluded the term ‘treaties’ on 
this view so that it might induce that treaties 
may be used as a tool of review. The ambiguity 
has left the question about the legal weight of 
treaties before the Court unanswered.
The Constitutional Court in various cases 
frequently referred to some international 
instruments to which Indonesia is party but 
left them undecided in terms of their domestic 
status. The Court has made reference to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) of 196639, the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 1984,40 the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
1988,41 and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, 1989.42 The Constitutional Court has 
hardly made a determination on the domestic 
status of those treaties due to the nature of 
its competence whereby it is only authorized 
to deal with the question of the legality of a 
law under the case against the Constitution. 
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38 Ibid., 151.
39 MK, case No. 065/PUU-II/2004, Judicial Review Law No. 26 of 2000 concerning Human Rights; MK, case No. 013-022/PUU-IV/2006, 
Judicial Review of Law of No. 27 of 2004 concerning Commission on the Truth and Reconciliation; MK, case No. 2-3/PUU-V/2007, 
Judicial Review of Law No. 22 of 1997 concerning Narcotics (2007); MK, case No. 5/PUU-VIII/2010, Judicial Review of Law No. 11 of 
2008 concerning Information and Electronic Transactions.
40 MK, case No. 21/PUU-VI/2008), Judicial Review of Law No. 2/Pnps/1964 concerning the Methods of Capital Punishment.
41 MK, case No. 2-3/PUU-V/2007, Judicial Review of Law No. 22 of 1997 concerning Narcotics.
42 MK, case No. 1/PUU-VIII/2010, Judicial Review of Law No. No. 3 of 1997 concerning Child Court.
It seems that references to those treaties are 
mainly intended to support the arguments 
concerning the provisions of the laws, which 
were deemed unclear. The courts, therefore, 
are not expected to endorse the authoritative 
nature of the treaties under domestic law. It 
is interesting to note, however, that the Court 
has hardly addressed the question whether 
these treaties are already incorporated into 
domestic law. The very legal fact that Indonesia 
is bound by theses treaties and that Indonesia 
has ratified them at international level was 
apparently sufficient to regard these treaties 
as relevant to be invoked. At any case, there 
was no legal argument of the courts in these 
cases which rules out the binding force of these 
treaties to Indonesia on the account of their 
non-incorporated status.
On the other hand, Indonesian courts 
have even moved forward to use treaties 
that are not binding Indonesia. Despite the 
fact that Indonesia is not party to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, it 
invoked Article 27 on internal law and Article 
31 on interpretation in order to ensure that 
Indonesia had not violated its obligations under 
a treaty.43 Unfortunately, the Court neither 
makes any argument explaining why it applies 
conventional provisions that are not binding 
Indonesia nor does it suggests that Indonesia 
is bound by them by virtue of customary 
international law.44 However, the application 
of Article 31 of the Convention to interpret the 
provisions of the ICCPR and the UN Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances of 1988, suggested 
that the courts may interpret treaties employing 
rules recognized by international law instead of 
domestic rules of interpretation. 
On a human rights case, the Supreme 
Court in its decision in 200745 makes reference 
to treaties that Indonesia is not yet a party to. 
In identifying the crimes against humanity, it 
invokes reference as envisaged in Article 7 (3) 
of the Rome Statute of International Criminal 
Court of 1998 by which Indonesia is not yet 
bound. In the Teuku Bantaqiah case46 in 2000, 
the Court dealt with a crime that amounted 
to a crime against humanity conducted by 24 
military personnel and one civilian against Teuku 
Bantaqiah and 56 of his pupils that were first 
wounded and later shot dead. The prosecutor 
charged the defendants with an ordinary crime 
under the criminal code because crimes against 
humanity were not yet included in the Code. 
The Court, however, interpreted the criminal 
code with the aid of Article 7 (1) Rome Statute 
and pronounced that such crime amounted to a 
crime against humanity. 
c. Treaties as Tools of Interpretation
The courts have also used treaties as a tool of 
interpretation. In the Teuku Bantaqiah case as 
cited above, although not directly intending to 
apply to the case at hand, the Court consulted 
provisions of the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 1984 which had not 
yet been included in the Criminal Code. The 
Court stated that states parties are obliged to 
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43 MK, case No. 2-3/PUU-V/2007, Judicial Review of Law No. 22 of 1997 concerning Narcotics, 420-425.
44 It is worth noting that, as mentioned above, the ICJ in the Case of Pulau Ligitan and Sipadan, before applying the rules of the said 
Convention to the case, it needed first to address question arising from the status of Indonesia as a non-party to the Convention 
before suggesting that Indonesia is bound by the rules of the Convention as customary rules.
45 MA, Eurico Guterres case No. 34 PK/PID.HAM.AD HOC/2007, 34-35.
46 PN of Banda Aceh, Teuku Bantaqiah Case, No. 11/Pid.B/Koneks/2000/PN-BNA.
include all of the acts of torture as a criminal 
act in their laws, which also applies to anyone 
who commits, tries to commit, gives assistance 
to, or is involved in the act of torture. The 
Court further stated that the states parties 
are also obliged to ensure that perpetrators 
of the criminal acts can be punished with a 
penalty appropriate for that criminal act. In the 
meantime, the Indonesian Criminal Code has 
not yet included the act of torture as envisaged 
by the provisions and, therefore, the Court 
could only rely on the ordinary criminal law. The 
Court did not explain the purpose of citing this 
provision but it appears that the provision was 
used merely to clarify the meaning of the act 
of torture and to ensure that the perpetrator 
was punished by virtue of ordinary criminal law 
in the absence of the implementing legislation. 
Treaties used as aid to interpretate are 
also developed in the Case on Judicial Review 
of the Law No. 26 of 2000 concerning Human 
Rights Court.47 In this case the Constitutional 
Court was requested to invalidate Article 43 
of the Law, which allows the application of the 
non-retroactive principle by which the Court 
is authorized to try those perpetrators who 
committed crimes specified in the Law before 
the date of its enactment. It had been claimed 
by the applicant that the Article is in breach of 
Article 28I (1) of the Constitution. 
The Court finally reached a conclusion that 
the non-retroactive principle is not absolute and 
subject to restrictive exception, i.e. the principle 
may be excluded for the sake of recognition and 
respect of human rights of others. In order to 
justify this far-reaching assertion, the Court 
cited provisions of legal instruments to which 
Indonesia is not a party. The Court, however, 
put all instruments, whether or not Indonesia 
is a party, on the same foot without any 
difference in treatment. The Court cited Article 
29 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as well as Article 15 (2) of the ICCPR and 
Article 7 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which provides provision similar to that 
of ICCPR. 
In a case on judicial review of the Law 
No. 22 of 1997 concerning Narcotics, the 
Constitutional Court addressed the important 
point raised by the Applicant, which argued that 
the death penalty stipulated in the Law violates 
the ICCPR which prohibits it. The Court held that 
the Law No. 22 of 1997 is the implementation 
of Indonesia’s obligations arising from the UN 
Convention on against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 and 
the crimes referred to in the Law are crimes that 
are according to the Convention particularly 
serious. 
The Court then concluded that by virtue 
of the Convention as interpreted in accordance 
with its ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of a treaty pursuant to Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the 
stipulation of death penalty under the Law 
No. 22 of 1997 is an implementation of treaty 
obligation under the Convention and the crimes 
referred to are the most serious crimes for 
which ICCPR does not prohibit the application 
of death penalty. The Constitutional Court in 
this case interpreted domestic law in a manner 
presuming the law did not constitute a violation 
of an international obligation of Indonesia 
arising from a treaty. But it is worth noting that 
the Court did not examine whether or not the 
provision of the ICCPR has been incorporated 
into domestic law before it considered whether 
there was a conflict between the Law and ICCPR. 
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The Court only acknowledged that there is an 
international obligation arising from ICCPR but 
did not clearly confirm whether such obligation 
is binding in domestic law.
3. Evaluation
The growing number of judicial decisions that 
cite treaties recently demonstrates that treaties 
have become well-recognized legal instruments 
for Indonesian courts. There is no doubt that, 
on the one hand, the courts may apply treaty 
provisions to the case at hand without and by 
virtue of national legislations. On the other 
hand, the attitude of the courts towards 
treaties as demonstrated in a number of cases 
above does not reveal any clear indication on 
the question of the status of treaties under 
domestic law especially with regard to the 
method on how the legal system incorporates 
treaties under domestic law. 
It appears from the judicial attitude that 
there is no consistency with regard to the 
courts treatment accorded to treaty norms. 
Neither the law nor the courts could provide 
clarification as to whether treaties they have 
invoked are applicable law of the forum and, if 
not, to what extent judges are allowed to apply 
such treaties. Nor it is clear whether by making 
such treaty references, treaties as referred to 
are regarded by the courts as legal sources of 
law in the sense that they are authoritative 
applicable law and are allowed by the courts 
as of right; or whether they are simply used as 
evidences to an existing statutory norm without 
authoritative weight and perceive them simply 
as non-formal sources of law due to their 
significance in terms of their legal consideration. 
It might be the case that the courts resort to 
treaties on the account that the provisions of 
Constitution and laws reveal ambiguities and 
uncertainties and take alternative courses 
of interpretation possible for the purpose of 
arriving at a solution most conductive to reason 
and justice. Transformation and adoption 
modes are interchangeably presumed under 
the judicial practices. 
The fact that Indonesian courts also make 
reference to treaties to which Indonesia is 
not a party may raise legal questions related 
to the treatment of treaty norms. There is no 
clear indication from the arguments of the 
courts whether the legal weight of these non-
binding treaties shall be distinguished from 
those that bind Indonesia, even for the purpose 
of providing aid to interpretation, since such 
a distinction is not always taken into account. 
Consequently, the answer to questions such 
as what the legal basis would be and to what 
purpose the invocation of a non-binding treaty 
provision should be is still unclear.
It is, however, quite clear that the courts 
have neither prescribed that the validity of a 
treaty in question shall depend on transforming 
legislation nor stipulated that such a treaty shall 
be transformed in a national legislation to be 
applicable in the given case as envisaged by a 
strict dualist system. 
The decision of the Constitutional Court in 
the recent case concerning the ASEAN Charter, 
which is expected to clarify the domestic 
status of treaties, also failed to make a legal 
determination on this very subject matter.48 
48 Further comments on the ASEAN Charter case before the Constitutional Court may be found in Agusman, Damos Dumoli, Apakah MK 
bisa Menguji Piagam ASEAN? (Can  Constitutional Court review ASEAN Charter?), ANTARA News (25 July 2011), accessible at http://
www.antaranews.com/berita/268734/apakah-mk-bisa-menguji-piagam-asean, last visited on 9 April 2013; Agusman, Damos Dumoli, 
Arti Judicial Review Piagam ASEAN bagi Sistem Hukum Indonesia (Significance of Constitutional Court’s Judicial Review of ASEAN 
Charter to the Indonesian Legal System), Opinio Juris, Foreign Ministry,  Vol. 13 Tahun 2013.
While indicating that the Charter forms part 
of domestic law, the Court is still ambiguous 
in explaining how and by what means the 
Charter becomes domestically valid. Instead of 
clarifying the means, the Court even made a 
controversial argument stating that:
‘…since the ASEAN Charter is embodied in 
the Law No. 38 of 2008, which approved/
ratified it,… and as a law it shall be binding 
the Parties to it, therefore State Parties to 
ASEAN Charter are bound by the Law’.49   
Although the Court finds that such an 
interpretation does reflect the reality since other 
states are never subject to any domestic law, 
the Court implies that it is bound to interpret it 
in that manner because of the undeniable fact 
that the Charter has been embodied in the Law 
No. 38 of 2008. Consequently, the Court has 
for this particular reason recommended that 
the use of the form law for approving/ratifying 
should be abandoned.
The Court has not indicated whether or 
not the Charter has acquired its domestic status 
by means of the Law, nor has it even declared 
whether such a domestic status is necessary. 
Having interpreted the existing constitutional 
order, the Court has simply stated that the 
Law No. 38 of 2008 serves as a legal basis for 
the validity of the ASEAN Charter without 
making a distinction as to its validity between 
domestic law and international law. This would 
erroneously mean that the Law No. 38 of 2008 
grants validity to the Charter either in domestic 
law or international law.
The Court is fully aware that such a 
conclusion is fallacious. The Court invokes the 
fact that the Charter embodied in the Law as 
forcing it to take such a fallacious outcome. In 
the next paragraph it argues its own conclusion 
by stating that:
Treaty obligations are not derived from 
the fact that the treaty is ratified by the law of 
the Parties but arise because the Parties agree 
to them by virtue of the legal principle of pacta 
sunt servanda.50 
D. Closing
From this view, it appears that the Court is 
actually reluctant to subscribe to the idea 
that the Law No. 38 of 2008 grants validity to 
the Charter but is compelled to come to such 
conclusion because the Law is intended to 
provide a basis for such validity. The assertion 
that the Law grants validity to a treaty does not 
automatically bring about a conclusive view 
that it would also constitute the incorporation 
of the Charter into domestic law. It seems that 
the Court does not hold the common idea of 
distinguishing between the entry into force 
of a treaty at international level and that of 
domestic level by means of incorporation. It is 
to suggest that the Court uses a monist line of 
thinking, by which it holds that once a treaty 
enters into force to the state, the treaty would 
automatically be binding in domestic law. The 
Court decision has therefore not yet contributed 
to the attempt for seeking a legal determination 
of the domestic status of a treaty as well as the 
mode for granting its domestic validity.
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49 MK, case No. 33/PUU-IX/2011, 194-95; The Court states: Karena Undang-Undang berlaku sebagai norma hukum, maka Negara 
Indonesia dan negara lain, dalam hal ini negara ASEAN wajib terikat secara hukum oleh UU 38/2008.
50 Ibid., 195; The Court states: Kewajiban yang dibebankan kepada suatu negara oleh perjanjian internasional tidaklah lahir karena 
perjanjian internasional bersangkutan telah disahkan sebagai Undang-Undang oleh pihak negara lain tetapi kewajiban tersebut lahir 
karena para pihak dalam hal ini negara-negara sebagai subjek hukumnya telah menyetujui bersama suatu perjanjian. Hal demikian 
sesuai dengan asas pacta sunt servanda.
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